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This essay examines the changing role of the ethical value of autonomy in law 
and policy relating to AIDS in a number of European jurisdictions. In the early 
years of the epidemic the autonomy of infected and at-risk persons, and of so-
cial groups was promoted as a means of reducing the spread of HIV in the 
general population. Accordingly autonomy was deemed worthy of respect for 
instrumental reasons. This means-end calculation was premised on the lack of 
medical therapies, as well as the need to avoid discrimination in order to pre-
vent at-risk persons from going underground as far as health care systems 
were concerned. In law this instrumentalisation of autonomy was reflected in a 
specific application of the proportionality test, i.e. to impose coercive or dis-
criminatory measures would be disproportionate, or even inimical, to the end of 
reducing the spread of HIV. This was a contingent analysis, strongly informed 
by the state of medical knowledge at the time, as well as by the relative power 
of professionals, health bureaucrats and lay activists. With the introduction of 
effective therapies such as Highly Active Retroviral Therapy (HAART) and Zi-
dovudine (AZT) the terms of the proportionality analysis have changed deci-
sively. As a result, it is now more likely than before that coercive measures will 
be implemented. 
 
I wish to thank Catherine Dodds, Susanne Jordan, Ambreena Manji, John 
Murphy and Rolf Rosenbrock for comments on earlier drafts. Versions of this 
paper were presented at the conference of the Irish Association of Law Teach-
ers, Kilkenny, Ireland, at the Centre for European Law and Politics (ZERP), 
University of Bremen, and to the Research Unit on Public Health Policy, Social 
Science Research Centre Berlin (WZB). 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is possible to view the history of AIDS to this date as a period in which the interac-
tion between medicine and law was profoundly influenced by certain fundamental 
values and goals. Our concern here is with the fundamental value of autonomy and 
its relation to the goal of stopping the spread of HIV in European populations. Our 
purpose is to clarify the manner in which the ethical value of autonomy has resonated 
with contemporary public health strategies, and how this has in turn conditioned the 
application (and non-application) of legal measures in the face of the epidemic. The 
central figure of legal discourse through which concern for autonomy has been sys-
temically linked with the goal of stopping the spread of HIV is the doctrine of propor-
tionality. 
 
In this piece we shall first distinguish two main justifications for the priority of respect 
for autonomy in ethics and law. These are the intrinsic significance of autonomy as 
definitive of human personhood, and alternatively its instrumental value as a means 
to the maximisation of other social goods. We then examine briefly the public institu-
tional forms through which autonomy is protected in Europe. Chief among these are 
constitutional and legal guarantees of individual freedom, which have also been es-
tablished in the European human rights order. Autonomy in the health care context is 
also indirectly protected by the codes of conduct enforced by the medical profession 
itself and through the increasing prominence of rights-oriented bioethics as a form of 
reflection upon medical activity. Having established the theoretical and institutional 
importance of the value of autonomy, we then examine its central place in public 
health responses to the spread of AIDS in most European countries. With some no-
table exceptions, commentators, activists and legislators supported a reflexive public 
health strategy which relied upon the informed, but unconstrained actions of individu-
als and social groups as the main means of containing the epidemic. Under this dis-
pensation there was no significant role for legally backed coercion and repression. In 
other words, both normatively and factually, an instrumental respect for autonomy 
has been the dominant theme of AIDS law and policy in its first decade and a half. 
 
We shall see that this dominance has been reflected in the interpretation and appli-
cation of the relevant provisions of criminal, civil and administrative law in most Euro- 6 
pean countries. In each case these rules have generally been interpreted as prohib-
iting secret and forcible testing, and compulsory treatment and detention. Even 
where the law is found (in certain jurisdictions or according to certain interpretations) 
to permit these measures, commentators have strongly advised against so proceed-
ing on public health grounds. In each case, we contend, an argument based on the 
principle of proportionality is being deployed. This holds that autonomy must be pro-
tected through the enforcement of criminal and civil law rights and through the non-
use of administrative law powers, in order to facilitate and encourage voluntary 
measures to deal with the spread of AIDS. It contends that coercion fails the test of 
proportionality because it is likely to be less successful, if not counterproductive, as a 
public health strategy. Both policy and law, therefore, justify respect for autonomy by 
reference to its instrumental usefulness in hindering the spread of HIV infection. The 
contingency of this position is demonstrated in the penultimate section of the present 
essay when we examine the impact of new therapies upon inherited public health 
policies and legal regimes. Therapy is now available for HIV/ AIDS, at least to the 
extent of securing a much longer life expectancy for the infected person. Given this 
advance it could now be argued that there is be considerably more to be gained from 
the imposition of coercive measures in abrogation of individual autonomy than was 
previously the case. As a result compulsory testing, detention and treatment may 
now satisfy the proportionality test. The new therapeutic regimes have also restored 
much of the power and prestige lost by the medical profession in the early years of 
the epidemic. We may expect, therefore, an increased use of biomedical disciplinary 
techniques quite independent of the enforcement of formal law. Thus, the instru-
mental justifications for the priority of autonomy in ethics, law, public health policy 
and medical practice are now more in question than they have been at any time 
since the early years of the epidemic.  7 
2.  PATIENT AUTONOMY IN EUROPE 
a. Philosophical  Basis 
Autonomy is widely accepted as a value of central importance by writers on law, 
medicine and ethics, in Europe as elsewhere.
1 A rigorous philosophical treatment of 
the concept is beyond the scope of this piece. We may, however, note the significant 
aspect of self-government and freedom of choice which the value embodies. The im-
plications of this elevation of autonomy for medical practice and health policy are 
clear. The original and proper source of authority for any procedure carried out upon 
an individual patient is the patient themselves.
2 Consent given by the patient is the 
only legitimate ground for almost any interference in their lives or any intrusion upon 
their person. He who deceives or coerces another, whether in medicine or else-
where, usurps this self-government, replacing autonomous with heteronomous 
choice.
3 Given its social power and prestige, given its close association with the 
state, and given its potential to penetrate deeply into individual lives, medicine repre-
sents an ongoing threat to self-determination. In a time of infectious disease this 
threat is inevitably multiplied. 
 
Both intrinsic and instrumental justifications are offered for the priority of autonomy in 
the ethical canon. If something is intrinsically valuable, it is held to be a good in it-
self.
4 Autonomy is intrinsically justified by the constitutive importance of self-determi-
nation and liberty to society and to individual subjects. On this basis it should be re-
spected independent of context, and regardless of the positive or negative conse-
quences of so doing. The right of self-determination is, thus, an almost absolute 
‘trump’ against the abrogation of individual autonomy by state or private actors.
5 In 
medicine the derived requirement of consent functions as a firm constraint upon the 
reasoning and practical action of health care professionals and policy makers. By 
                                                 
1   Cf. for example, I Kennedy, Treat me Right. Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University 1991) 385-413. 
2   This position is developed by, HT Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press 1986). 
3    Cf. TL Beauchamp & JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (4
th ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press 1994) 120-132. 
4   This approach to ethical reasoning is more typical of continental European, than of Anglo-Saxon 
writers, cf. J-C Galloux, ‘Ethique et brevet ou le syndrome bioéthique’, Receuil Dalloz Sirey (1993) 
83-90. 
5   Cf. R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth 1977).  8 
contrast, if something is instrumentally valuable, it is held to be good only and in so 
far as it is a means to some other, higher end.
6 Autonomy is instrumentally justified 
by those individual and social goods which tend to be produced when it is respected 
and promoted. This makes of autonomy a contingent value, which may be set aside 
or demoted where to do so would improve individual or overall welfare. Context and 
consequences are all. The right of self-determination is, thus, merely one, defeasible 
element among many in the calculus of general utility. In medicine there is general 
agreement on a core meaning for welfare: the physical and mental well-being of the 
individual. In the context of public health this is adapted to include the physical well-
being, including freedom from infection, of the population as a whole. The autonomy 
of patients is to be respected in so far as it promotes their own health and that of their 
fellows. It need not be so respected where its exercise would be inimical to these 
goals. Decisions on this point incorporate and depend upon variable scientific data 
regarding the aetiology of disease and likely human behaviour. As these data are 
ever changing, such decisions are inherently open ended, revisable and reversible. 
We can already see the ethical form of AIDS policy-making in this. Should the rights 
of sufferers and those at risk be respected absolutely, or only on a contingent basis? 
If the latter, what are the elements of the welfare calculus? We know that they in-
clude the law, considered as both constitutive variable and dependent outcome. We 
also know that the law itself provides for comparative utilitarian reasoning through the 
doctrine of proportionality. 
 
 
b. Institutional  Basis 
Respect for autonomy is also at the heart of the European legal order. It is reflected 
in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which enshrines the right to 
liberty and security of the person (Art. 5) and the right of privacy (Art. 8). At a national 
level, the German Basic Law of 1949 mandates the state to protect the dignity of the 
individual (Art. 1 I), as the well as the right of the individual freely to develop their 
personality (Art 2 I), their right to bodily integrity (Art. 2 II 1) and their liberty (Art. 2 II 
2). In particular the right of personality has been held by the German Federal Con-
                                                 
6    Cf. TL Beauchamp & JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (4
th ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press 1994) 47-55.  9 
stitutional Court to include a right to informational self-determination, meaning the 
right to decide when and to what extent personal information is made known to oth-
ers’.
7 The United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the ECHR into Brit-
ish law, making its guarantees an explicit feature of the latter for the first time.
8 It has 
also been held that the right of self-determination forms an immanent part of the 
common law.
9 The ancient writ of habeas corpus further testifies to the foundational 
value of individual liberty in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. However, these rights are no-
where without qualification. In the ECHR, for instance, Articles 5 and 8 are qualified 
by provisions permitting measures ‘for the protection of health’.
10 German law also 
allows fundamental rights to be abridged, or indeed wholly overridden, where this is 
necessary to avert an imminent danger to the community or to more important rights 
of others.
11 In the United Kingdom, given the qualifications to Articles 5 and 8 ECHR, 
mentioned above, infectious diseases legislation would probably also survive scrutiny 
under the Human Rights Act 1998.
12 We shall see later that specific measures taken 
in the interests of public health are nonetheless subject to review having regard to 
their necessity and effectiveness. The law facilitates thereby a structured, instru-
mentalist calculation which may subordinate individual autonomy to the greater public 
health in a specific set of circumstances. 
 
A discussion of institutional guarantees of autonomy would be incomplete were it lim-
ited to the rules of general (or state) law. As van Hocken and Ost have pointed out, 
‘instead of a legal system in the form of a hierarchized pyramid, law [may now be] 
presented as a network within which the places where law is created are multiply-
ing’.
13 One important ‘place’ of this sort is the medical profession itself, which exer-
                                                 
7   Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 65, 1 (42); for a general discussion, cf. HD Jarass 
& B Pieroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Kommentar (4
th ed. München: CH 
Beck 1997) 65-67. 
8   Cf. B Watt, ‘HIV/ AIDS and European Human Rights Law’ [2000] European Human Rights Law 
Review 54-65. 
9    Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All England Reports 643 (HL per Lord Scarman 
dissenting at 652c). 
10  For an application of these exceptions, cf. the decision of the Commission in Acmanne v Belgium 
(1985) 40 Decision & Reports 251 (ECommHR). 
11  Cf. HD Jarass & B Pieroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Kommentar (4
th ed. 
München: CH Beck 1997) 277, 325-326  . 
12  For a discussion of this point, cf. J Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1997) 37-39. 
13  M van Hoecke & F Ost, ‘Legal Doctrine in Crisis: Towards a European Legal Science’, (1998) 18  10 
cises a high degree of self-regulation in most European countries. Medical councils 
and tribunals, composed more or less of doctors themselves, promulgate codes of 
ethics and enforce professional discipline.
14 Traditionally such codes have empha-
sised technical competence, the dignity of the profession and loyalty as between 
doctors. More recently, in response to patient demands and broader cultural trends, 
there has been an effort to construe the duties of doctors in terms of the rights of 
their patients. Chief among these is the right to self-determination. Thus the French 
Code de Deontologie Medical states that 
Le consentement de la personne examinée ou soignée doit être recherché 
dans tous les cas. 
Lorsque le malade, en état d'exprimer sa volonté, refuse les investigations 
ou le traitement propose, le médecin doit respecter ce refus aprés avoir 
informée le malade de ses consequences... (Art 36)
15 
Not only must consent be obtained but the patient also has a right to clear and ade-
quate disclosure of relevant information prior to reaching his decision (Art. 35).
16 The 
United Kingdom General Medical Council has similarly imposed an obligation on 
doctors to respect the autonomy of their patients.
17 Doctors who violate these norms 
are open to disciplinary sanction up to and including the revocation of their licence to 
practice. We shall see that, in some countries at least, general standards of profes-
sional conduct were augmented by specific responses to the spread of AIDS.
18 Both 
sets of norms had at least as much influence among medical practitioners dealing 
with the epidemic as the relevant rules of state law. Finally, mention should be made 
of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine signed in 1997 by most mem-
ber states of the Council of Europe.
19 The general aim of this Convention is to pro-
mote common ethical and legal responses to new and problematic developments in 
                                                                                                                                                          
Legal Studies 197-215, 209. 
14  For an overview of these structures, cf. A Rogers & D Durand, Bioethics in Europe (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Press 1995) 183-214. 
15   For a short introduction to medical discipline in France, cf. J Penneau, La responsabilité du 
médécin (2nd ed Paris: Dalloz 1996) 103-113. 
16  It must be said, however, that disclosure may be limited where the patient would otherwise be 
harmed thereby (Art. 35). 
17  General Medical Council, Serious Communicable Diseases (London: GMC 1997) 3. 
18  For example, cf. General Medical Council, HIV and AIDS (London: GMC 1988). 
19  Among the countries which did not sign were Belgium and Germany. The full text of the Convention 
can be found at http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/164e.htm (site visited 17.21, 7/11/00).  11 
medicine such as genetic testing, organ transplantation and embryo research. It too 
accords central importance to the value of patient autonomy.
20 Article 5 states that 
An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person 
concerned has given free and informed consent to it. This person shall 
beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature 
of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks. The person 
concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time... 
 
                                                 
20    For an overview of the provisions of the Convention, cf. S Oschinsky & Y Oschinsky, ‘La 
convention pour la protection des droits de l’homme et de la dignité de l’être humain à l’égard des 
applications de la biologie et de la médecine’, Journal des Tribunaux 1997, 465-474.  12 
3.  AUTONOMY IN AIDS POLICY 
a.  Threats to Autonomy 
In the mid-1980s, opinions varied as to the appropriate public health response to 
AIDS. Policymakers were reminded in the first instance of the battery of statutory 
measures, largely carried over from the previous century, which could be deployed to 
combat the epidemic.
21 These included mass screening of the population, forced 
testing, isolation and compulsory treatment. All had been used by European states, 
with varying degrees of success, against the great epidemics of the early industrial 
era: typhus, small pox, tuberculosis, cholera and so on. In general, the operation of 
this legislation depended on the judgement of medical experts as to its likely 
effectiveness. To take one example, in Germany the Imperial Law on Epidemics of 
1900 accorded powers of initiation and review to the Imperial Health Office in 
Berlin.
22 The potential use of medical and state power in this way represented a vivid 
threat to the autonomy of thousands of individuals, whether infected with HIV or 
merely suspected of being infected.  
 
As it turned out coercion was chosen in just two jurisdictions in Western Europe: 
Bavaria and Sweden. In Bavaria the response was based upon three principles of 
public health: 1) that intervention be as early and intensive as possible; 2) that 
sources of infection be dealt with without exception; and 3) that all necessary meas-
ures be taken to break the chain of infection.
23 Routine compulsory testing was intro-
duced for prostitutes, non-European immigrants and new entrants to the civil service. 
Gay clubs and saunas were shut down. A system of contact tracing was initiated. In-
fected persons were barred from certain forms of employment and the uncooperative 
                                                 
21  For reviews of such legislation in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland respectively cf. 
J-L Denis & F Tulkens, ‘Santé publique et droit pénale en Belgique’, Revue de science criminelle et 
de droit penal comparé (1) janv - mars 1996, 1-12; G Giudicelli-Delage, ‘Droit à la protection de la 
santé et droit pénal en France’, Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal comparé (1) janv - 
mars 1996, 13-30; W Loschelder, ‘Gesundheitsrechtliche Aspekte des Aids-Problems’, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1987, 1467-1470; M Gravelli, ‘Santé publique et droit pénale en Italie’, 
Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal comparé 1996, 31-49; O Guillod, ‘Lutte contre le 
SIDA: Quel rôle pour le droit pénal?’ Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 114 (1997), 130-141. 
22  These powers are now exercised by the Robert-Koch Institut under the Federal Law on Epidemics; 
for a historical discussion, cf. K Glaser, Vom Reichsgesundheitsrat zum Bundesgesundheitsrat. Ein 
Betrag zur Geschichte des Deutschen Gesundheitswesens (Stuttgart: Georg Thieme 1960) 1-19. 
23  Cf. P Gauweiler, ‘Zur Notwendigkeit eines geschlossenen Gesamtkonzepts staatlicher Massnahme 
zur Bekämpfung der Weltseuche AIDS’, in B Schünemann & G Pfeiffer (eds), Die Rechtsprobleme 
von AIDS (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1988) 37-60.  13 
could be isolated and detained. Sweden’s tradition of paternalist welfarism was re-
flected in its 1985 decision to include infection with HIV among the venereal diseases 
covered by the Communicable Diseases Law of 1968.
24 This allowed inter alia for the 
registration of infected people, contact tracing, and the isolation of patients believed 
to be behaving in a manner likely to spread the disease. Persons who believe they 
have been infected and those identified through contact tracing are required to report 
for testing. Those who are found to be infected must submit to regular medical ex-
amination, inform all previous sexual partners and all doctors or dentists by whom 
they are subsequently treated. The police may be involved in enforcing compliance 
by recalcitrant patients.
25 Putting these policies in terms of human rights law, it has 
been noted that they ‘involve a massive abridgement of the fundamental right of free 





b.  Reflexive Public Health 
Across the rest of Western Europe, and since 1989 in Eastern Europe also, the op-
posite approach has been taken. Instead of coercion, voluntary behavioural change 
was put at the heart of AIDS policy. This strategy was fundamentally premised upon 
an instrumentalist understanding of autonomy. Given the highly intimate settings in 
which the virus is passed from person to person and in the absence of a cure or a 
vaccine, individuals were encouraged to protect themselves and the wider popula-
tion. Thus, Catherine Manuel has noted  
L’orientation délibérée vers des attitudes volontaires plutôt que dictées par 
l’obligation, dans un souci de respecter le choix des personnes, mais aussi de 
façon à les responsabiliser et à obtenir un changement de leurs habitudes.’
27 
                                                 
24  R Danziger, 'HIV Testing and HIV Prevention in Sweden' (1998) 316 British Medical Journal 293-
295.  
25  B Hendriksson & H Yetterberg, ‘Sweden: The Power of the Moral(istic) Left’, in DL Kirp & R Bayer, 
AIDS in the Industrialized Democracies: Passions, Politics, Policies (Rutgers University Press: 
Camden NJ 1992) 315-338, 323ff. 
26  J Hofmann, ‘Verfassungs- und verwaltungsrechtliche Probleme der Virus-Erkrankung Aids unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung des bayerischen Massnahmenkatalogs’, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1988, 1486-1494, 1491. 
27   C Manuel et al, ‘Les Options de la Politique Française en Matiere de Lutte contre le SIDA’, 
Semaine des Hopîtaux Paris 1994, 843-849, 844 (emphasis added).  14 
Behaviour in the private sphere was to be conditioned by exposure to health educa-
tion campaigns. These, however tardy and varied in detail, conveyed information on 
two essential points: the risk of infection and the means of reducing this risk. As Gid-
dens has pointed out, ‘in conditions of modernity, for lay actors as well as for experts 
in specific fields, thinking in terms of risk and risk assessment is a more or less ever-
present exercise’.
28 AIDS policy depended, therefore, upon the reflexive incorpora-
tion of risk analysis into individual decision-making.
29 To put it another way, the site 
of disease control had been displaced from an external state-medical authority, to the 
autonomous subjectivity of affected and at-risk persons.  
 
The public health campaign had more than individual actors as its subjects however. 
At the outset high risk groups were treated by public health officials and health care 
planners simply as epidemiological categories. However, some quickly mobilised and 
were mobilised in the fight against AIDS. In response to lobbying, especially by the 
gay community, but also by groups of prostitutes and drug users, ministers and 
health civil servants directed moral and material support towards self-help organisa-
tions. This development was, it must be admitted, more typical of some countries, 
such as Germany,
30 the Netherlands
31 and the United Kingdom,
32 than others. Thus, 




35 the preponderance of intravenous drug users 
                                                 
28   A Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: 
Polity 1991) 123-124. 
29  For a discussion in relation to public health generally, cf. P Bennett & R Hodgson, ‘Psychology and 
Health Promotion’, in R Bunton & G Macdonald, Health Promotion: Disciplines and Diversity 
(London, New York: Routledge 1992) 23-48. 
30  Cf. M Pollak, ‘AIDS in West Germany: Co-ordinating Policy in a Federal System’, in BA Misztal & D 
Moss, Action on AIDS: National Policies in Comparative Perspective (Westport [CT]: Greenwood 
Press 1990) 121-133. 
31  Cf. JK van Wijngaarden, ‘The Netherlands: AIDS in a Consensual Society, in DL Kirp & R Bayer, 
AIDS in the Industrialized Democracies: Passions, Politics, Policies (Camden [NJ]: Rutgers 
University Press 1992) 252-280. 
32  Cf. V Berridge, AIDS in the UK. The Making of Policy, 1981-1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1996) c.3. 
33  M Pollak, ‘AIDS Policy in France: Biomedical Leadership and Prevention Impotence’, in BA Misztal 
& D Moss, Action on AIDS: National Policies in Comparative Perspective (Westport [CT]: 
Greenwood Press 1990) 79-100. 
34  D Moss, ‘ AIDS in Italy: Emergency in Slow Motion’, in BA Misztal & D Moss, Action on AIDS: 
National Policies in Comparative Perspective (Westport [CT]: Greenwood Press 1990) 135-166. 
35   JM de Miguel & D Kirp, ‘Spain: An Epidemic of Denial’, in DL Kirp & R Bayer, AIDS in the 
Industrialized Democracies: Passions, Politics, Policies (Camden [NJ]: Rutgers University Press 
1992) 168-184.  15 
(less articulate and less well-organised) among the infected population similarly lim-
ited voluntaristic strategies. It is nonetheless true that in all countries gay groups 
played a prominent role in articulating and promoting standards of behaviour in risky 
situations. In one formulation this ‘code of the condom’ states that as long as the par-
ties to homosexual intercourse use a condom there is no moral obligation on them to 
disclose their HIV status and no duty to submit to testing.
36 Adherence to these 
standards allowed gay men an active role in protecting themselves, as well as 
enabling the community as a whole to constitute and direct itself normatively. The 
code involved, in other words, a novel coincidence of individual and group autonomy. 
This coincidence was endorsed on pragmatic and instrumental grounds by much of 
the health care establishment. Thus, for example, a cornerstone of Dutch AIDS policy 
was the belief that: 
Prevention is each individual’s responsibility. Only if the norms governing 
behaviour in the social milieu of the individual supported such change 
would individuals respond. From this perspective close co-operation with 
the organisations representing target groups was essential.
37 
Self-regulation and co-operation were only possible, however, where infected 




c.  The Role of the Law 
It would certainly be wrong to portray the legal response to AIDS as uniform across 
Europe, even as between those countries which adopted a non-coercive approach. 
Notwithstanding this, there was an unmistakable tendency among courts, 
commentators and policy makers to advocate the non-application of repressive 
infectious disease legislation by doctors and officials, and the application of rules on 
informed consent, refusal of treatment and confidentiality to the benefit of infected 
persons and those suspected of being infected. Laws conferring powers were 
interpreted in a minimalist, doctrines establishing and vindicating rights in a 
                                                 
36   DL Chambers, ‘Gay Men, AIDS and the Code of the Condom’, 29 Harvard Civil Rights - Civil 
Liberties Law Review 353-410 (1994). 
37  JK van Wijngaarden, ‘The Netherlands: AIDS in a Consensual Society, in DL Kirp & R Bayer, AIDS 
in the Industrialized Democracies: Passions, Politics, Policies (Camden [NJ]: Rutgers University  16 
maximalist fashion. Commentators reconciled autonomy and the public health within 
the terms of the proportionality test familiar from continental administrative and 
constitutional law, as well as from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights.
38 This pattern of analysis allows the several available means to a particular 
public policy end to be evaluated, compared and ranked in the order in which they 
burden the rights of affected legal subjects. Although formally a doctrine of public 
law, we hope to demonstrate that it also structured, even if sometimes only implicitly, 
the specification of private and criminal law principles in the context of AIDS. 
 
In this context it is most useful to adopt the definition of proportionality applied in 
Germany. This is because the test has been developed in the case law of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court explicitly as a means of constraining state-
imposed restrictions on the fundamental rights of citizens.
39 It is roughly applied as 
follows.
40 First, identify the end to be obtained: here slowing the spread of HIV in the 
population and protecting uninfected individuals. Second, identify the means 
proposed: here forced and secret testing, isolation and compulsory treatment. Third, 
ask whether these means are effective, in a basic causative sense, to achieve the 
end sought. Since coercion tends to drive high risk populations underground and 
therefore out of reach of social and medical services it is not only likely to be 
ineffective, it may in fact be counterproductive. Fourth, ask whether there are less 
burdensome alternatives to the proposed means which would be equally or more 
effective. In fact it was generally agreed that behavioural change is much more likely 
if autonomy and privacy are respected and if discrimination is systematically 
countered.
41 At bottom it is thus clear that the value of autonomy formed an integral 
part of the legal as well as the policy calculation: to protect autonomy was to protect 
the public health, to threaten autonomy was to endanger the public health. The 
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39  W van Gerven,  'The Effect of Proportionality on the Actions of Member States of the European 
Community: National Viewpoints from Continental Europe', in E Ellis (ed), The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford: Hart 1999) 37-63, 44-48. 
40  Cf. HD Jarass & B Pieroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Kommentar (4
th ed. 
München: CH Beck 1997) 456-459. 
41  For a general discussion, cf. K Weare, ‘The Contribution of Education to Health Promotion’, in R 
Bunton & G Macdonald, Health Promotion: Disciplines and Diversity (London, New York: 
Routledge 1992) 66-85.  17 
eminent Australian judge Michael Kirby has called this ‘the HIV paradox’.
42 Similarly, 
the European Court of Human Rights has accepted public health considerations as 
an important justification for the high degree of protection afforded to the privacy of 
persons infected with HIV under Article 8 ECHR. It stated that: 
The disclosure of [health data] may dramatically affect [the individual's] 
private or family life, as well as social and employment situation, by 
exposing him or her to opprobrium and the risk of ostracism. For this 
reason it may also discourage persons from seeking diagnosis or 
treatment and thus undermine any preventive efforts by the community to 
contain the pandemic.
43 
However, we should note again the precariousness of the particular calculation and 
the vulnerability of the paradox to empirical dissolution. Both were established at a 
time when there was no vaccine against HIV and no cure for AIDS, when the 
progress of the disease in the individual patient was outwith the ken and control of 
medical science, when prevention was the only policy option and autonomous 
behaviour modification the only means of prevention. In recent times several of the 
relevant variables have changed. We shall return to this. It is first necessary to 
examine briefly the law in Europe as it protects and limits individual autonomy in the 
context of AIDS. 
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4.  AUTONOMY, AIDS AND THE LAW 
a. Testing 
The development of an effective HIV test in the mid-1980s lead to the emergence of 
a distinct set of the legal issues around AIDS. For doctors and public health 
specialists the test made it possible to determine the modes of transmission of the 
virus, to distinguish risky from less risky behaviours and to identify carriers. The 
doctor, thus, became the gatekeeper to the future medical and social status of his 
patient. Given these consequences and the fact that it could only be carried out on a 
blood sample, the test implicated the various legal rules on consent and disclosure. 
The information produced by the test in an individual case could also provide the 




b. Secret  Testing 
Most jurisdictions impose criminal and civil sanctions where an individual’s rights to 
physical integrity and self-determination are violated. In the medical context the 
conduct of therapeutic or diagnostic procedures is generally held to be justified by the 
consent of the patient thereto; the doctor is correspondingly relieved from civil and 
criminal responsibility. Legally sufficient consent is obtained where disclosure has 
been made of the nature of the procedure and the significant risks accompanying it.
44 
The standard of disclosure has been defined variously as that which would be 
required by a reasonable body of medical practitioners, or by a reasonable patient in 
the position of the actual patient, or by the particular patient in the case.
45 In the 
context of AIDS, judicial and academic opinion was divided on the question of 
whether a patient had to give a specific consent to the carrying out of a HIV test 
above and beyond the consent which he gave to the taking of the necessary blood 
sample. A minority held that in such cases the patient could be taken as (implicitly) 
consenting to the conduct of a range of tests, including that for HIV, upon the blood, 
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at least where a general check-up had been requested.
46 Indeed a doctor who failed 
to carry out a HIV test, where this was indicated by the risk-profile of the patient, 
would be failing to comply with the standard of care expected of him in civil law.
47 By 
contrast the majority held that, given the serious social and psychological 
consequences of a positive test result for the patient, he and not the doctor should 
decide on whether it was to be carried out.
48 In essence the requirement of special 
consent is both inspired by and indicative of ‘AIDS exceptionalism’.
49 Diagnosis of 
HIV status was accordingly to be separated from normal or routine medical practice 
and a legal duty to seek consent imposed upon doctors. As well as the possible 
consequences for the patient, public health reasons were adduced in support of the 
specific consent requirement. Not to have such a rule would either permit or create 
the suspicion that secret testing was being carried out. At-risk patients would 
accordingly avoid the medical system making routine care and preventative 
education almost impossible. 
 
 
c. Compulsory  Testing 
The testing of patients against their will is permitted under public health legislation in 
many European jurisdictions.
50 This has been upheld, in relation to tuberculosis, by 
the European Commission on Human Rights as a permissible restriction on the right 
of privacy in certain circumstances.
51 As mentioned above, these powers were relied 
upon by the Bavarian authorities to introduce compulsory testing of prostitutes, 
certain classes of immigrant and new entrants to the civil service. Elsewhere forcible 
testing was rejected in the light of a series of public health considerations.
52 Since 
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HIV antibodies may not be formed for up to six months after infection, a negative test 
result could not guarantee that the individual concerned was not HIV positive. Indeed 
such a result might lead to a false sense of security and the adoption or resumption 
of risky practices. For the extended period in which the patient was infected but 
asymptomatic there was little that medical science could do for them. Furthermore, 
the huge cost of systematic and repeated testing would be vastly disproportionate to 
the remote benefits to be obtained thereby.
53 Finally the probable stigma which would 
accompany forcible testing would drive those most in need of care and counselling 
underground. Thus, in France doctors are required to recommend testing to certain 
categories of patient, but not to impose it upon them.
54 It must be added that in most 
countries, there is mandatory testing where blood, sperm or organs are to be 
donated. The data obtained thereby are normally anonymized and do not, therefore, 
lead to adverse consequences for the person concerned. 
 
 
d.  Detention and Compulsory Treatment 
Public health law in most jurisdictions also allows the detention and isolation of 
persons suffering or suspected to be suffering from infectious diseases in order to 
prevent the spread of infection.
55 In the United Kingdom AIDS (but not HIV infection) 
was added to the conditions for which these measures could be taken,
56 but this 
power was used only once and to so much protest that it is unlikely to be used 
again.
57 In Germany, by contrast, neither AIDS nor HIV were added to the schedule 
of infected conditions contained in the Federal Law on Epidemics. Furthermore, only 
the Bavarian authorities interpreted the Law as conferring upon them the power to 
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extend detention and isolation to HIV/ AIDS by analogy.
58 Legal and policy 
arguments against detention and isolation were explicitly based upon a 
proportionality analysis: there was little to be gained, having regard especially to the 
expense involved, from quarantining persons identified as HIV positive when 
members of the public were best advised to protect themselves by engaging in safer 
sexual and drug use practices.
59 The issue of compulsory treatment, including 
vaccination, did not arise because of the inability of medical science to offer affected 
patients anything more than palliative care. Indeed this lack of an effective therapy 






                                                 
58   For the reasoning behind this, cf. P Gauweiler, ‘Kasernierung von Aids-kranken Prostituierten?’ 
Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 1989, 85-89. 
59  For Germany, cf. M Bruns, ‘Nochmals Kasernierung von Aids-kranken Prostituierten’, Zeitschrift für 
Rechtspolitik 1989, 241-244; for the United Kingdom, cf. ED Acheson, ‘AIDS: Achallenge for the 
Public Health’ (1988) The Lancet 662-666; for France, cf. Comité Consultatif National d’Ethique 
pour les Sciences de la Vie et de la Santé (CCNE), Avis sur les Problèmes Ethiques posées par la 
Lutte contre la Diffusion de l’Infection par le VIH (N
o 14) 16th December 1988 = http://www.ccne-
ethique.org/francais/start.htm (site accessed 11.17, 7/11/00). 
60  Cf. CCNE, Avis sur les Problèmes Ethiques posées par la Lutte contre la Diffusion de l’Infection 
par le VIH (N
o  14) 16th December 1988 = http://www.ccne-ethique.org/francais/start.htm (site 
accessed 11.17, 7/11/00).  22 
5.  AUTONOMY AND THE FUTURE OF AIDS 
a. Medical  Advances 
The pro-autonomy approach to AIDS, taken by health policy makers, lawyers and 
judges, was based upon an instrumental concern to deploy the most efficient, least 
intrusive means of slowing the spread of the virus. As has been shown, the outcome 
of this proportionality analysis was decisively influenced by the absence of any 
clinical therapies, i.e. without effective drugs, there was a stark choice between 
voluntarism and repression. In the last five or six years, however, much improved 
treatments have been developed and introduced into the care of persons infected 
with HIV. So-called ‘Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy’ (HAART), which in fact 
requires the taking of variable combinations of drugs, dramatically reduces the rate at 
which the virus is reproduced in a patient’s body.
61 It thereby protects their immune 
system from the perilous deterioration which leads to full-blown AIDS and ultimately 
to death. This breakthrough has had a revolutionary impact upon the morbidity and 
mortality of people infected with HIV. Studies in North America have shown a 50-80% 
decrease in the rates of hospitalisation for people with AIDS, a 50-70% decrease in 
incidents of major AIDS-related opportunistic infections,
62 and a fall in deaths from 
AIDS-related illness from 100 per 1000 to 20 per 1000 cases.
63 It has also been 




More successful still has been the use of Zidovudine (AZT) as a means of reducing 
peri-natal transmission of HIV. New-born children of HIV positive mothers are now 
subject to an 8% risk of infection, over three times lower than the risk in 1994.
65 
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These therapeutic advances displace a major assumption of the previous public 
health consensus: the untreatability of infected and ill persons.
66 They also raise a 
range of new considerations relating to side-effects, treatment compliance, the 
development of drug resistance and the abandonment of safe practices. We are 
forced, therefore, to revisit issues of consent to testing and treatment and to 
reconsider the well-established primacy of voluntarism in European AIDS policy.
67 
We shall see that there are good reasons to fear at least a partial revival of 




b. Secret  Testing 
With the advent of new therapies HIV/ AIDS has become a chronic condition, 
treatable even if not (yet) curable. As a result observers have identified a ‘re-
medicalisation’ or ‘normalisation’ of AIDS.
69 Normalisation can here be understood in 
two senses: medical and social. First, responses to the disease are increasingly 
conditioned by a series of medical standards or norms; through this extension of 
medical knowledge the profession has reasserted control over what had been an 
area of heightened lay involvement. Second, as a chronic disease AIDS is now a 
routine, unexceptional part of the social, as well as the medical landscape in Western 
countries. While much prejudice and discrimination endure, AIDS can no longer be 
characterised as a crisis or a state of emergency in Europe. Both of these senses of 
normalisation are significant for the legal issue of whether patients must give specific 
consent to the testing of their blood for HIV. Since therapies are now available, it can 
be argued, for example, by a doctor defending a civil action, that the test was 
medically indicated, that it was in fact a necessary element of providing the patient 
with adequate care.
70 In ethical terms it could be claimed that the test was carried out 
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for the benefit of the patient alone and not simply and solely for the protection of as 
yet uninfected persons. Expert witnesses will now be available to testify to the 
orthodoxy of conducting tests on these grounds. 
 
Even more forceful is the argument that, given the social normalisation of AIDS, the 
consequences of being tested are no longer such as to justify a duty to obtain 
specific consent. If a positive diagnosis is no longer a ‘death sentence’ and if earlier 
conceptions of AIDS as a plague have been marginalised, the patient has (only) as 
much to fear from testing for HIV as from other, currently routine tests. Finally, we 
noted that commentators gave much weight to the possibility that people at risk of 
infection would be driven underground by the fear of secret testing. This 
consideration may now be less significant given that treatments for AIDS-related 




c. Compulsory  Testing 
Under the new therapeutic dispensation, similar arguments may be made in favour of 
compulsory testing. First, it is again true that such tests would be carried out, at least 
ostensibly, for the patient’s benefit. Second, clinical studies indicate that the sooner 
HAART is commenced the more likely it is to be effective in prolonging the patient’s 
life and improving its quality.
71 Compulsory testing would accordingly be a way of 
drawing infected persons into the medical system and subjecting them to a treatment 
regime. Third, the potential stigma associated with compulsory testing is allegedly 
diminished by the current construction of AIDS as manageable rather than fatal. 
 
These arguments are, however, less than compelling. Although the cost of the HIV 
test has fallen, it is still likely that compulsory testing in the form of a widespread 
screening campaign would be disproportionate to the benefit produced thereby in 
terms of lives saved and improved. In addition, coercive testing is always likely to be 
highly stigmatic and politically unacceptable, regardless of the prevailing medical 
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Buchbinder, ‘Avoiding Infection after HIV Exposure’, 279/ 1 Scientific American 84 (July 1998).  25 
construction of the particular condition. Most significant perhaps is the fact that, 
notwithstanding the new drugs, the most effective and least costly means of 
protection against AIDS is still prevention through voluntary behaviour modification. 
The variety of drug cocktails which make up HAART are very expensive and the 
regime is frequently difficult to follow. It might be expected, however, that medical 
professionals, reinstated in a position of authority, would apply techniques of ‘soft 
coercion’ in their interactions with individual patients.
 72 Such instances of micro-
compulsion would not need or even refer to public health law. 
 
Proposals have also been made and implemented, not for general screening, but for 
the selective testing of members of certain high risk groups without their consent. For 
example, Professor Michael Closen has argued vociferously that health care workers 
should be forced to submit to HIV testing as a condition of their employment.
73 In the 
United Kingdom a doctor was disqualified from practice by the General Medical 
Council for failing to take an HIV test, in spite of having a strong suspicion that he 
was infected.
74 Pregnant women in the United States, who are also drug users, have 
been targeted for compulsory testing in order to enable them to proceed to AZT 
therapy for the protection of the foetus.
75 In France and the United Kingdom all 
pregnant women are offered HIV tests at pre-natal clinics as a matter of policy.
76 
Furthermore, a British local authority was recently successful in obtaining a court 
order compelling a HIV-positive mother to allow her newly born baby to be tested for 
the virus.
77 Both parents were practitioners of complementary medicine and were 
sceptical of the orthodox biomedical understanding of HIV/ AIDS. The first instance 
judge completely dismissed this scepticism as unreasonable. A test would be of ‘very 
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substantial’ advantage, as it would allow therapy to commence as soon as possible if 
the child was found to be infected. The local authority did not seek an order 
preventing the mother from breast feeding, although commentators have seen this as 




d.  Detention and Compulsory Treatment 
It can also be claimed that the variables in the proportionality analysis at the heart of 
AIDS law and policy have changed as regards the forced detention and treatment of 
affected patients. Admittedly it is still difficult to defend quarantine and isolation per 
se. HIV is still transmitted, now as before, largely by intimate means in private 
circumstances. It is not contagious in the manner, for example, of tuberculosis or 
cholera. There is, therefore, little to be gained by detaining infected persons against 
their will when the population as a whole might still be effectively motivated to protect 
themselves. In addition, if scientific predictions prove correct, HAART will significantly 
extend the asymptomatic phase of infection. To introduce quarantine in this changed 
context would be both more burdensome, because of its necessarily longer average 
duration, and more misleading, in so far as it induced a belief that persons not so 
detained were free from infection. On the other hand, the very availability of 
treatment creates a focus for coercion that simply did not exist previously. The 
possibility of compulsory therapy has also increased due to three further, related 
factors: the difficulty for the patient in complying with the treatment regime; a 
perceived increase in unsafe behaviours among members of high risk groups; and 
the changing profile of the HIV-infected population in Europe. 
 
Combination drug therapy imposes a huge burden upon patients’ lives. They are 
subject to the discipline of taking as much as sixteen pills a day, in various 
combinations, some before, some after meals. They may suffer serious side effects 
such as nausea, diarrhoea, fatigue and the uneven spread of body fat.
79 
Furthermore, because treatment has to be initiated and followed during the 
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asymptomatic phase, these side effects are often not compensated for by any 
immediate relief of pain or distress. Each of these factors are generally associated 
with non-adherence to prescribed therapies.
80 It is no surprise, therefore,  to find that 
American researchers have estimated that up to 50% of treatment failures are due to 
non-adherence to the HAART programme.
81 
 
A related issue is raised by the increase in risky behaviours, such as ‘barebacking’ 
(i.e. unprotected intercourse between men), which has been the subject of 
considerable media publicity and academic discussion.
82 The growing willingness to 
engage in unsafe practices has been related to the arduous and seemingly indefinite 
nature of HAART, as well as to a sense that after years of precaution and fear, there 
is now some cause for optimism among affected and at-risk persons.
83 Unsafe 
practices leading to infection create new risks under the current therapeutic 
dispensation. In particular re-infection with a different strain of HIV may render the 
patient’s existing course of therapy ineffective. A further consequence, already 
observed, has been the emergence of drug-resistant strains of the virus.
84 
 
In addition the demographics of AIDS have changed significantly since the 1980s. 
Numbers of infected drug users and non-drug using heterosexuals have risen relative 
to numbers of infected gay men.
85 As we have noted, the gay community in many 
countries was able to develop an autonomous normative response to the epidemic 
which partly forestalled any drive to coercion. Both individually and collectively gay 
men often set the standard for reflexive behaviour modification and the establishment 
of self-help mechanisms.
86 This capability, it has been claimed, was a contingent 
product of political coherence, a diverse class background and strong group 
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solidarity.
87 By contrast drug users are understood by many health care professionals 
and policy makers to be unable to exercise the same level of control over their 
behaviour.
88 Homelessness, poverty, general ill health and difficulties with the police, 
as well as the addiction itself, all militate against successful compliance with 
complicated medical instructions. A general lack of collective identity and 
autonomous support structures are seen as having blocked the emergence of group 
norms concerning safe practices.
89 In this case it may be claimed that the state would 
be justified in taking paternalistic measures to ensure treatment of such persons 
where they are infected with HIV. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
In the past epidemics were often met with a coercive response. This history was 
drawn upon by commentators on AIDS in order to forestall repressive measures. 
Accordingly, the pragmatic, instrumental elevation of the value of autonomy was 
bolstered by a subtle message to the effect that changed standards of civility and 
respect for human rights rendered older approaches socially and morally obsolete.
90 
On examination, AIDS policy debates and legal responses to the epidemic, testify to 
the rise to prominence of individual subjectivity in law and medicine. Especially since 
the 1960s, the self-governing human subject has become the focus, indeed the 
supporting pillar of the ‘new’ public health, of constitutionally guaranteed human 
rights, and of contemporary medical ethics.
91 Given this, it might be asserted that 
hithertofore liberal AIDS policies will both endure and will result in a more 
voluntaristic, less coercive approach to other epidemics too. There are reasons to 
doubt this, however. 
 
First, where a disease is more contagious and where there is reduced opportunity for 
self-protection coercion is still justifiable on the proportionality principle outlined 
above. It would therefore be legally and constitutionally permissible: AIDS 
exceptionalism is just that. Second, because AIDS was an entirely new epidemic, a 
decision had to made on whether it should be included in the list of conditions 
targeted by public health law. By contrast, should other conditions re-emerge, as has 
been the case with tuberculosis, for example, a raft of repressive measures is 
already on the statute books ready for use. Third, we would contend, perhaps 
controversially, that this new subjectivity is not recognised for all persons affected 
either by AIDS or by other infectious diseases. In medicine, law and ethics, autonomy 
is accordingly a privilege rather than a right. This contention is borne out when the 
changing demographics of the AIDS-affected population is considered in conjunction 
with the new therapeutic possibilities discussed above. In Western societies, AIDS 
and related conditions, like tuberculosis, increasingly affect the poor, who include the 
great majority of intravenous drug users. AIDS has also become a disease 
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predominantly of developing countries. As potential immigrants, the inhabitants of 
such countries are registered by European authorities and law in terms inter alia of 
public health risk. We may posit, therefore, an emerging double split in AIDS policy 
as between rich and poor, and as between domestic and foreign. Both the poor and 
immigrants are traditionally perceived as irrational and difficult to control. As such 
they cannot be relied upon to exercise their autonomy in their own best interests or in 
the interests of society as a whole. Accordingly both have been subject to coercive 
intervention by the state. The poor, but more especially the peoples of Asia and 
Africa, have been represented as reservoirs of infection and disease in European 
culture for centuries. Their status as the bearers of subjective rights is questionable. 
Given the frequently observed correlation between poverty and ill health including 
epidemic illness, it is, therefore, hard to argue for a conclusive triumph of autonomy 
in the realm of public health law. Arbeitsgruppe Public Health 
Public Health ist Theorie und Praxis der auf Gruppen bzw. Bevölkerungen bezogenen 
Massnahmen und Strategien der Verminderung von Erkrankungs- und Sterbewahrscheinlichkei-
ten durch Senkung von (pathogenen) Belastungen und Förderung von (salutogenen) Ressourcen. 
Public Health untersucht und beeinflusst epidemiologisch fassbare Verursachungszusammenhän-
ge und Bewältigungsmöglichkeiten. Solche Interventionen sind sowohl vor als auch nach Eintritt 
von Erkrankungen bzw. Behinderungen von gesundheitlichem Nutzen. Insofern erstreckt sich 
der Gegenstandsbereich von Public Health sowohl auf Prävention als auch auf Krankenversor-
gung. Wissenschaftlich ist Public Health eine Multidisziplin, politisch-praktisch sollen die daraus 
herleitbaren Wahrnehmungsmuster, Entscheidungskriterien und Handlungspostulate in nahezu 
alle gesellschaftlichen Gestaltungsbereiche und Politikfelder integriert werden. Im Vergleich zum 
dominanten Umgang des Medizinsystems mit gesundheitlichen Risiken und Problemen beinhal-
tet Public Health tiefgreifende Veränderungen der Wahrnehmungs-, Handlungs- und Steuerungs-
logik für die daran beteiligten Professionen und Institutionen. Die Arbeitsgruppe untersucht för-
dernde und hemmende Bedingungen für Entstehung, Entwicklung und Wirkungen der mit 
Public Health intendierten sozialen Innovation. 
 
Unter diesem Gesichtswinkel konzentrieren sich die überwiegend qualitativ ansetzenden und 
zum Teil international vergleichenden Arbeiten der Gruppe gegenwärtig (1999) auf Prävention 
und Gesundheitsförderung durch Organisationsentwicklung und Organisationslernen (z. B. in 
Betrieben und Institutionen), Interventionen in die Lebensweise (an den Beispielen Aids und 
Ernährung) und Veränderungen im Bereich der Krankenversorgung (an den Beispielen 
Krankenhaussteuerung und Versorgung von Aids-Patienten). 
Die AG Public Health im WZB ist Mitglied im Berliner Zentrum Public Health (BZPH), einer 
gemeinsamen Einrichtung der Technischen Universität Berlin (TU), der Freien Universität Berlin 
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